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Abstract—Spurred by the recent advances in deep learning to
harness rich information hidden in large volumes of data and
to tackle problems that are hard to model/solve (e.g., resource
allocation problems), there is currently tremendous excitement in
the mobile networks domain around the transformative potential
of data-driven AI/ML based network automation, control and
analytics for 5G and beyond. In this article, we present a
cautionary perspective on the use of AI/ML in the 5G context
by highlighting the adversarial dimension spanning multiple
types of ML (supervised/unsupervised/RL) and support this
through three case studies. We also discuss approaches to mitigate
this adversarial ML risk, offer guidelines for evaluating the
robustness of ML models, and call attention to issues surrounding
ML oriented research in 5G more generally.
Index Terms—5G and Beyond 5G Mobile Networks, Adver-
sarial Machine Learning, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
A considerable amount of industry and academic research
and development endeavors are currently paving the way
toward 5G and Beyond 5G (B5G) networks. 5G networks,
unlike its 4G counterpart, are foreseen to be the underpinning
infrastructure for a diverse set of future cellular services well
beyond mobile broadband to span multiple vertical industries.
To flexibly and cost-effectively support diverse use-cases and
to enable complex network functions at scale, 5G network
design espouses several innovations and technologies such as
artificial intelligence (AI) along with software-defined net-
working (SDN), network function virtualization (NFV), multi-
access edge computing (MEC), and cloud-native architecture
that are new to the domain of mobile telecommunications.
Technical developments toward 5G and B5G of mobile
networks are quickly embracing a variety of deep learning
(DL) algorithms as a de facto approach to help tackle the
growing complexities of the network problems. However, the
well-known vulnerability of the DL models to the adversarial
machine learning (ML) attacks can significantly contribute
to broadening the overall attack surface for 5G and beyond
networks. This observation motivates us to deviate from the
on-going trend of developing a newer ML model to address
a 5G network problem and, instead, examine the robustness
of the existing ML models in relation to the 5G networks
under adversarial ML attacks. In particular, we focus on
representative use cases for deep neural network (DNN)-driven
supervised learning (SL), unsupervised learning (UL), and
reinforcement learning (RL) techniques in the 5G setting and
highlight their brittleness when subject to adversarial ML
attacks.
Through this article, we would like to draw the attention of
the research community and all stakeholders of 5G and beyond
mobile networks to seriously consider the security risks that
emerge from the rapid unvetted adoption of DL algorithms
across the wide spectrum of network operations, control, and
automation, and urge to make robustness of the ML models
a criterion before they are integrated into deployed systems.
Overall, we make the following two contributions.
1) We highlight that despite the well-known vulnerability of
DL models to adversarial ML attacks, there is dearth of
critical scrutiny on the impact of the wide-scale adoption
of ML techniques on security attack surface of 5G and
B5G networks.
2) We bridge the aforementioned gap through a vulnerability
study of the DL models in all its major incarnations (SL,
UL, and Deep RL) from an adversarial ML perspective
in the context of 5G and B5G networks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Primer on 5G Architecture
A schematic diagram of the 5G network architecture is
depicted in Figure 1. Apart from the user equipment (UE), the
5G system features a cloud-native core network, a flexible and
disaggregated radio access network (RAN), and a provision
for multi-access edge (MEC) cloud for reduced latency. The
gNodeB (gNB) of the RAN comprises of split-able access
nodes, distributed and centralized units (DU and CU), to
efficiently handle evolved network requirements. The gNB
connects to the MEC to significantly reduce the network
latency for selected applications by availing edge server com-
puting at the MEC cloud which is close to the radio service
cells. For instance, to cater to the ultra-reliable low-latency
communication (URLLC) use-case of industry automation, the
RAN radio unit along with the DU, CU, and the MEC can be
installed onsite. Thus, 5G network architecture enables appli-
cations to be deployed remotely (App 3 and App 4) or near the
edge (App 1 and App 2) where low latency is a requirement.
The provision of MEC also reduces the aggregated traffic load
on the transport networks that is responsible for connecting
RAN to the core network. The 5G core network (5G-CN) is a
cloud-native network that stores subscriber databases and hosts
essential virtualized network functions for network operations
and management. Although, the network management and
control functions are shown to be co-located with the core
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2Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of 5G network architecture illustrating the disaggregated RAN architecture with distributed unit (DU) and centralized unit (CU)
components; the MEC for improved latency; and the cloud-native core network and system orchestration components.
in the figure, they can be flexibly deployed at the edge as
needed.
B. ML in 5G and B5G Networks
A wide spectrum of DL algorithms are being developed
for the broad context of wireless communications and 5G
networking to deal with problems that are either hard to solve
or hard to model [1]. For instance, optimal physical network
resource allocation for NFV is an NP-hard problem and
so require exponential computational power with increasing
system size [2]. Deep RL (DRL)-based solutions are proposed
to efficiently address resource allocation problems (e.g., [3]).
Network channel estimation for efficient beamforming is a
problem that is hard to model and deep neural network
(DNN)-based SL solution is well-accepted to tackle it [4].
Moreover, in certain use-cases, conventional expert systems
become inappropriate due to real-world constraints, such as
limited availability of power, where AI can perform effectively.
For instance, deep autoencoder based systems can replace
the power-hungry RF chain hardware with small embedded
sensor systems enabling them to sustain longer on onboard
power supplies [5]. DL algorithms generally outperform the
conventional approaches in solving mobile network prediction
problems such as physical layer channel prediction by SL, sig-
nal detection problems such as recovering transmitted signals
from noisy received signals by UL, and optimization problems
like resource allocation by RL.
III. WIDENED ATTACK SURFACE IN ML-DRIVEN 5G AND
B5G NETWORKS
The security of the 5G networks is well explored (e.g., [6]),
but little attention has focused on the security of 5G and B5G
networks in the face of the adversarial ML threat [8]. In this
section, we briefly introduce the adversarial ML in general and
subsequently outline the adversarial ML risks in 5G and B5G
networks.
A. Overview of Security Attacks on ML
The vulnerability of the ML algorithms, especially the DL
models, to the adversarial attacks is now well-established,
where adversarial inputs are small carefully-crafted pertur-
bations in the test data built for fooling the underlying ML
model into making wrong decisions. An adversary can often
successfully target an ML model with no knowledge of the
model (black-box attack), or some knowledge (grey-box at-
tack), or full knowledge (white-box attack) of the target model.
An adversary can attack the model during its training phase
and in its testing phase as well. The training phase attacks are
known as “poisoning attacks" and the test time attacks are
known as “evasion attacks". Evasion attacks are commonly
known as adversarial attacks in the literature [9].
More formally, an adversarial example x∗ is crafted by
adding a small indistinguishable perturbation δ to the test
example x of a trained ML classifier f (.) where δ is ap-
proximated by the nonlinear optimization problem provided
in equation 1, where t is the class label.
x∗ = x + argmin
δx
{‖δ‖ : f (x + δ) = t} (1)
In 2013, Szegedy et al. [10] observed the discontinuity in
the DNN’s input-output mapping and reported that DNN is not
resilient to the small changes in the input. Following on this
discontinuity Goodfellow et al. [11] propose a gradient-based
optimization method for crafting adversarial examples. This
technique is known as fast gradient sign method (FGSM).
Papernot et al. [12] craft adversarial perturbation using a
saliency map-based approach on the forward derivatives of
3Fig. 2. Applicability of ML across the 5G network architecture and a depiction of how ML models contribute to significantly enhance the attack vectors
beyond the traditional security risks through new adversarial ML risks [6] [7]
DNN. This approach is known as Jacobian saliency map
based attack (JSMA). Carlini et al. [13] crafted three different
adversarial attacks using three different distance matrices (L1,
L2, and L∞). More details about adversarial ML attacks are
described in [7], [9].
B. Added Threat from Adversarial ML for 5G and Beyond
5G and B5G networks embrace ML-driven solutions for
improved accuracy and smarter network operations at scale.
Figure 2 illustrates network problems from different network
segments of 5G, namely user devices, RAN, MEC, core
networks, and the network management and control layer that
have recently attracted ML-based solutions from all the three
categories of ML. However, in light of the above discussion
in §III-A, the DL-powered ML models gaining popularity
for 5G and B5G networks are vulnerable to the adversarial
attacks thereby further aggravating the security risks of future
generations of mobile networks.
In our attempt to show the feasibility of adversarial ML
attacks on 5G systems we take three well-known ML models—
one from each of the three ML families of algorithms (UL, SL,
and DRL)—from wireless physical layer operations relevant
to 5G and B5G context and show the vulnerability that naive
use of ML brings to future mobile networks. We choose all the
three ML models for our case studies from the physical layer
network operations because of the maturity of ML-research in
the context of AI-driven 5G networking and the availability
of open-sourced ML models backed up with accessible data-
sets1.
1https://mlc.committees.comsoc.org/research-library/
IV. HIGHLIGHTING ADVERSARIAL ML RISK FOR 5G AND
BEYOND: THREE CASE STUDIES
In this section, we critically evaluate to exemplify the
security threats posed by DL models in the three canonical
ML families of algorithms (UL, SL, and RL) in the 5G and
B5G networking and present our work as three different case-
studies.
A. Attacking Supervised ML-based 5G Applications
Automatic modulation classification is a critical task for
intelligent radio receivers where the signal amplitude, carrier
frequency, phase offsets, and distribution of noise power
are unknown variables to the receivers subjected to real-
world frequency-selective time-varying channels perturbed by
multipath fading and shadowing. The conventional maximum-
likelihood and feature-based solutions are often infeasible due
to the high computational overhead and domain-expertize that
is involved. To make modulation classifiers more common in
modern 5G and B5G networked devices, current approaches
deploy DL to build an end-to-end modulation classification
systems capable of automatic extraction of signal features in
the wild [14].
We pick a convolutional neural network (CNN)-driven SL-
based modulation classification model in this case study to
illustrate the added dimension of vulnerability introduced in
the networks by it. We use the well-known GNU radio ML
RML2016.10a dataset that consists of 220000 input examples
of 11 digital and analog modulation schemes (AM-DSB, AM-
SSB, WBFM, PAM4, BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, QAM64,
CPFSK, and GFSK) on the signal to noise ratio (SNR) ranging
from -20 dB to 18dB [15]. However, we exclude the analog
4modulation schemes from our study and consider only the
eight digital modulations from the data set because from 2G
onward all mobile wireless standards are strictly digital com-
munications. Figure 3 depicts the classification performance
of the CNN model in the multi-class modulation classification
for the signals between -20dB to 18dB of SNR.
Fig. 3. Accuracy of the CNN-based automatic modulation classifier before
and after the adversarial ML attack. A clear drop in the accuracy of the
classifier with the increasing SNR indicates the success of the adversary in
compromising the integrity of the modulation classifier that is seen as viable
in the 5G and B5G networks.
To show the feasibility of an adversarial ML attack on
the CNN-based modulation classifier we make the following
assumptions:
• We consider the white-box attack model where we assume
that the adversary has a complete knowledge about the
deployed modulation classifier.
• Goal of the adversary is to compromise the integrity
of the CNN classifier leading to a significant decay in
the classification accuracy which is the measure of the
success of the adversary.
To craft the adversarial examples to fool the CNN classifier,
we use the Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack [13] for each mod-
ulation class by minimizing the L2 norm on the perturbation δ,
such that when the perturbation δ is added to the input x and
sent to the CNN-based modulation classifier C it misclassifies
the input x. More details on the C&W attack are available in
[13]. The performance of the CNN-based modulation classifier
before and during the adversarial attack is depicted in Figure 3.
A distinct drop in the accuracy of the modulation classification
after the adversarial attacks indicates the brittleness of deep
supervised ML in 5G and B5G applications. Moreover, our
results show that the approbation of unsafe DL models in the
physical layer operations of the 5G and B5G networks can
make the air-interface of the future networks vulnerable to
adversarial ML attacks.
B. Attacking Unsupervised ML-based 5G Applications
In 2016, O’Shea et al. proposed the idea of channel au-
toencoders which is an abstraction of how an end-to-end
radio communication module functions in real-world wireless
systems [17]. The deep autoencoder-based communication
model gains rapid popularity and is seen as a viable alternative
to the dedicated radio hardware in the future 5G and beyond
networks [5]. Figure 4(a) depicts the conceptual design of
the channel autoencoder that we choose as a deep UL model
for this case study. We assume the model is subjected to an
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel and apply
the parameter-configurations provided in [16]. To perform the
adversarial ML attack on the channel autoencoder we consider
the following threat model and compare the performance of
the model with and without attack.
• We assume a white-box setting, where the adversary has
complete knowledge of the deployed ML model. We
further assume that the autoencoder learns a broadcast
channel. The proposed adversarial attack on channel
autoencoder can be converted into a black-box adversarial
attack, where the adversary has zero knowledge of the
target ML model, by following the surrogate model
approach provided in [18].
• The goal of the adversary is to compromise the integrity
of channel autoencoder and the success of the adversary
is measured by the elevated block error rate (BLER) with
improving SNR per bit (Eb/N0).
We take the following two-step data-independent approach
to craft adversarial examples for the channel autoencoder:
1) Sample the Gaussian distribution randomly (we sampled
Gaussian distribution because the channel is AWGN) and
use it as an initial adversarial perturbation δ;
2) Maximize the mean activations of the decoder model
when the input of the decoder is the perturbation δ.
This produces maximal spurious activations at each decoder
layer and results in the loss of the integrity of the channel
autoencoder. Figure 4(b) shows the performance of the model
before and under the adversarial attack. Moreover, the figure
suggests the adversarial ML attack is often outperforms the
traditional jamming attacks.
Since the idea of channel autoencoder in a wireless device
is to model the on-board communication system as an end-
to-end optimizable operation, the adversarial ML attacks on
channel autoencoder show that the application of unsupervised
ML in the 5G mobile networks increases its vulnerability to
adversarial examples. Hence, we argue that deep UL-based 5G
networked systems and applications need to be revisited for
their robustness before being integrated into the 5G IoT, and
related systems.
C. Attacking DRL-based 5G Applications
In the final case study, we have performed the adversarial
ML attacks on an end-to-end DRL autoencoder with a noisy
channel feedback system [19]. Before providing the details
of the adversarial ML attack on the DRL-based commu-
nication system, we briefly discuss the DRL-based channel
autoencoder. Goutay et al. [19] take the same architecture we
consider in the previous case study §IV-B and add a noisy
feedback mechanism to it, as shown in Figure 5(a). The end-
to-end training procedure involves:
1) The RL-based transmitter training by a policy gradient
theorem [20] to ensure that the intelligent transmitter
5Fig. 4. (a) Architecture of channel autoencoder for 5G and future networks proposed in [16]; (b) Performance of the channel autoencoder before and under
the adversarial ML attack and traditional jamming attack. The Block Error Rate (BLER) versus Eb/N0 curves indicates that adversarial ML attack does not
only deteriorate the model’s performance but often outperformed the known jamming attack.
Fig. 5. (a) Architecture of DRL-based channel autoencoder with noisy feedback for 5G and future networks proposed in [19]; (b) Performance of DRL
autoencoder with noisy feedback before, during, and after the adversarial ML attack. A clear drop in the performance of the receiver during the attack indicates
the success of the adversary in compromising the DRL autoencoder-based end-to-end communication system in future wireless networks.
learns from the noisy feedback after a round of com-
munication.
2) SL model-based receiver training to train the receiver as
a classifier.
Both transmitter (encoder) and receiver (decoder) are imple-
mented as separate parametric functions (differentiable DNN
architectures) that can be optimized jointly. The communica-
tion channel is modeled as a stochastic system that provides a
conditionally distributed relation between the encoder and the
decoder of the channel autoencoder. More details on the design
and training procedure are available in [19]. The considered
threat model for this case study is given as:
• We choose a black-box settings where the adversary
does not know the target model. We assume black-box
settings because these are realistic as the attacker has
no information about the deployed encoder and decoder
model, and the adversary can only attack by adding
perturbation in the broadcast channel. We also assume
that the adversary can perform an adversarial ML attack
for “n”-time steps.
• The goal of the adversary is to compromise the perfor-
mance of the DRL autoencoder with noisy feedback for
a specific time interval. The success of the adversary
is measured by the degradation in the decoder’s perfor-
mance during the attack interval.
To evaluate the robustness of DRL model, we exploit the
transferability property of the adversarial examples, which
states that adversarial examples compromising an ML model
will compromise other ML models with high probability if the
underlying data distribution is same between these two models.
We opt for the surrogate model approach for performing
the adversarial ML attack. So we transfer the adversarial
examples crafted in case study (§IV-B) and measure the
average accuracy of the receiver. We run the DRL autoencoder
with a noisy feedback system for 600-time steps (one time-
step is equal to one communication round) and perform the
adversarial attack between 200 to 400-time step window. We
transfer 200 successful perturbations from the previous case
study (§IV-B) and report the performance for the DRL system.
Figure 5(b) provides the performance of the receiver (decoder)
of the DRL autoencoder. It is evident that the performance
of the receiver degrades from 95% to nearly 80% during the
6adversarial attack window. The recovery in the performance
after the adversarial attack explicates that the end-to-end DRL
autoencoder communication system can recover because of the
noisy feedback and DRL adaptive learning behavior.
Our results, as presented in this section, confirm the fea-
sibility of adversarial ML attacks on DL-based applications
from all the three types of ML algorithms that are prevalent
in the 5G network systems and highlight the additional threat
landscape emerges due to the integration of vulnerable DL
models to the 5G and B5G networks.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the inadequacies of ML models to
address the comprehensive technology needs of 5G networks
and we recommend a set of improving measures toward robust
ML models appropriate for the 5G and B5G approbation.
A. Towards Robust ML-Driven 5G and Beyond Networks
Robustness against adversarial ML attacks is a very chal-
lenging problem. To date, there does not exist a defense that
ensures complete protection against adversarial ML attacks. In
our previous works [9], [21], we have performed an extensive
survey of the adversarial ML literature on robustness against
adversarial examples, and showed that nearly all defensive
measures proposed in the literature can be divided into:
1) modifying data approaches (adversarial training, feature
squeezing, input masking, etc.);
2) auxiliary model addition approaches (generative model
addition, ensemble defenses, etc.);
3) modifying model approaches (defensive distillation,
model masking, gradient regularization, etc.).
Our results in §IV indicate that ML-based 5G applications
are very vulnerable to the adversarial ML attacks. There does
not exist much work on the recommendations and guidelines
for evaluating the robustness of ML in 5G applications. In the
following, we have provided a few important evaluation guide-
lines for evaluating the ML-based 5G applications against
adversarial ML attacks. These insights are extracted from the
Carlini et al. [22] and our previous works [9], [23].
• Many defenses are available in the literature against
adversarial attacks but these defenses are limited by the
design of the application. Using them without considering
the threat model of ML-based 5G applications can create
a false sense of security. So for ML-based 5G application
threat models must clearly state the assumptions taken,
type of the adversary, and the metrics used for evaluating
the defense.
• Always test the defense against the strongest known
attack and use it as a baseline. Evaluating for an adaptive
adversary is also necessary.
• Evaluate the defense procedure for gradient-based,
gradient-free, and random noise-based attacks 2.
• Clearly state the evaluation parameters (accuracy, recall,
precision, F1 score, ROC, etc.) used in validating the
2https://www.robust-ml.org/
defense and always look for a change in the false positive
and false negative scores.
• Evaluation of the defense mechanism against out-of-
distribution examples and transferability-based adversar-
ial attacks is very important.
Although these recommendations and many others in [9],
[21]–[23] can help in designing a suitable defense against
adversarial examples but this is still an open research problem
in adversarial ML and ripe for investigation for ML-based 5G
applications.
B. Beyond Vulnerability to Adversarial ML Attacks
Apart from the vulnerability of the ML models to the
adversarial ML attacks, we underline the following drawbacks
that call into question the viability of ML-driven solutions to
be integrated into the real-world 5G networks any time soon.
1) Lack of real-world datasets: The availability of large
data from real-world sources is the fuel of the ML models.
Especially the advancement of modern DL research critically
depends on having easy access to a variety of data-sets in the
research community. However, diversified real-world data-sets
in telecommunication and mobile networking is not readily
available due to privacy issues and stringent data-sharing poli-
cies adopted by the global telecom operators. Hence, a large
amount of ML research in the telecom domain still depends on
synthetic data which often falls short of truly representing real-
world randomness and variations. Thus, current state-of-the-art
ML models in telecommunication applications are oftentimes
can not replace the domain-knowledge based expert systems
currently in operation.
2) Lack of explainability: In ML studies, the accuracy of a
model comes at the cost of explainability. The DL models are
highly accurate in providing output but lack an explanation of
why a particular output is achieved. Explanation of a decision
taken often becomes a critical requirement for the 5G network,
especially because many critical services such as transport
signaling, connected vehicles, and URLLC depend on the 5G
infrastructure.
3) Lack of operational success of ML in real-world mobile
networks: A plethora of ML models exists in the literature of
mobile networking, albeit there is a dearth of operational ML
models in currently operational mobile networks. We perform
attacks on the ML models running under the ideal environ-
ment, simulated in favorable lab conditions, and still, the
victim models can not withstand the adversaries. In the real-
world mobile network, the ML models need to be deployed
and functional under unforeseen random environments leaving
them more vulnerable to the cyber-attacks. Moreover, the com-
putational overhead, requirement of hardware enhancement,
and run-time delay introduced by the ML models become
critical factors to bring operational success for ML in the real-
world large-scale mobile networks like 5G.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Security and privacy are uncompromising necessities for
a modern and future global networks standards such as 5G
7and Beyond 5G (B5G) and accordingly there is an interest in
fortifying it to thwart attacks on it and withstand the rapidly
evolving landscape of future security threats. This article
specifically highlights the approbation of a large number
of DL-driven solutions in 5G and B5G networking gives
rise to security concerns that remain unattended by the 5G
standardization bodies, such as the 3GPP. We argue this is
the right time for cross-disciplinary research endeavors con-
sidering ML and cybersecurity to gain momentum to enable
secure and trusted future 5G and B5G mobile networks for
all future stakeholders. We hope that our work will motivate
further research toward a “telecom-grade ML” that is safe and
trustworthy enough to be incorporated into 5G and beyond
5G networks, thereby power intelligent and robust mobile
networks supporting diverse services including mission-critical
systems.
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